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Abstract 
In this paper we develop empirical measures for the strength of spillover effects. Modifying 
and extending the framework by Diebold and Yilmaz (2011), we quantify spillovers between 
sovereign credit markets and banks in the euro area. Spillovers are estimated recursively from 
a vector autoregressive model of daily CDS spread changes, with exogenous common factors. 
We account for interdependencies between sovereign and bank CDS spreads and we derive 
generalised impulse response functions. Specifically, we assess the systemic effect of an 
unexpected shock to the creditworthiness of a particular sovereign or country-specific bank 
index to other sovereign or bank CDSs between October 2009 and July 2012. Channels of 
transmission from or to sovereigns and banks are aggregated as a Contagion index (CI). This 
index is disentangled into four components, the average potential spillover: i) amongst 
sovereigns, ii) amongst banks, iii) from sovereigns to banks, and iv) vice-versa. We highlight 
the impact of policy-related events along the different components of the contagion index. 
The systemic contribution of each sovereign or banking group is quantified as the net 
spillover weight in the total net-spillover measure. Finally, the captured time-varying 
interdependence between banks and sovereigns emphasises the evolution of their strong 
nexus. 
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1. Introduction	
The current financial crisis, that developed from a global banking crisis in the summer of 
2007 to a European sovereign debt crisis since 2010, is one of the most challenging episodes for 
policy makers both at governments and central banks since the introduction of the euro. After the 
collapse of “Lehman Brothers” in autumn 2008, the fear of contagion is one of the most prominent 
issues on the agenda both for financial research and policy making. Clearly, the fear of contagion 
has and still does put pressure on policy makers and influences policy decisions in particular within 
the euro zone. Being able to gauge the potential risk of contagion is therefore of paramount interest 
for policy makers and agents in financial markets. In the existing empirical and theoretical literature 
there exists a broad range of definitions for contagion, see e.g. Forbes (2012). By the same token, a 
variety of approaches and methods on how to measure contagion has been proposed. Dornbusch et 
al. (2000) or Forbes and Rigobon (2002), among others, describe contagion as a significant increase 
in cross-market interdependencies after a “large” shock hits one country or a group of countries. 
Contagion viewed from that perspective is hence determined by the portion of interdependency that 
exceeds any fundamental relationship among countries and that is not attributable to the magnitude 
of common shocks. More generally, contagion can also be associated with a negative externality 
triggered by institution(s) or market participant(s) in distress that might affect other players. 
Constâncio (2012) extends the definition of contagion in two directions: the existence of an initial 
trigger-event and the abnormal speed, strength or scope that accompanies financial instability. More 
recently, contagion is sometimes explained as a propagation of shocks that are related to a perceived 
non-zero probability of a possible albeit unlikely break-up of the euro zone.  
                 For the purpose of this paper we borrow as benchmark the approach put forward by Allen 
and Gale (2000) who explain contagion as a consequence of spillover effects. In their example, a 
banking crisis in one region may spill over to other regions. Contagion in their view is hence the 
phenomenon of extreme amplification of spillover effects. Spillover effects are therefore a necessary 
- but not a sufficient - condition for contagion. But when are spillovers “extreme” and when would 
they trigger contagion and how can they be distinguished from those that occur within “normal” i.e. 
“non-dangerous” magnitudes? In this paper we present a method and an index that can answer these 
questions in quasi real time.We propose an analytical and empirical framework for measuring 
spillover effects and we illustrate our method by providing an empirical application to the inter-
linkages between sovereign credit markets and systemically relevant banks. By analysing daily data 
of CDS spreads we quantify those spillover effects based on a 80-days rolling regression window. 
Our measure internalises interdependencies of the variables in our system. We aggregate this 
information into a Contagion Index. This index has four main excessive spillover components: 
average potential spillover i) amongst sovereigns, ii) amongst banks, iii) from sovereigns to banks 3 
 
                                                      
2 The EFSF was created on 9 May 2010 as a temporary facility and will be merged with the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM hereafter). The ESM was set up on 24
 June 2011 as a permanent crisis mechanism. The share of the countries 
guaranteeing the EFSF’s debt is in proportion to each country’s capital share in the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusted 
to exclude countries with EU/IMF supported programs. 
and iv) vice-versa.  
               There  are  several  mechanisms  that  could  explain  the  transmission  of  spillover  effects 
within these four channels. As regards spillover amongst euro zone sovereign bonds they are at least 
indirectly linked by the joint monetary policy transmission mechanism, the Eurosystem’s collateral 
framework and by a shared default risk of euro zone member countries via EFSF and future ESM.
2 
Spillover effects between (domestic) sovereign creditworthiness and (domestic) banks are induced 
by a feedback mechanism that intensified during the financial crisis. The dynamics of such a 
sovereign-and-banks feedback loop are driven by systemic financial externalities that have a 
negative impact on the real economy and consequently on public finances, see e.g. Acharya et al. 
(2011), Alter and Schüler (2012), Bicu and Candelon (2012),  De Bruyckere et al. (2012), Merler 
and Pisani-Ferry (2012) or Gross and Kok (2012). Sovereign debt amplification feeds back into the 
financial sector by affecting balance sheets of financial institutions and thereby having a negative 
impact on domestic banks’ ratings that pushes up their funding costs, see e.g. BIS (2011). With a 
domestic financial sector in distress government guarantees for the financial sector lose credibility 
when sovereign creditworthiness deteriorates as well and thereby yielding further amplification of 
spillovers. If government liabilities increase, this causes a higher debt burden and hence increased 
pressure for sovereigns. Finally, there are several channels that transmit contagion risks within the 
banking sector alone, such as common credit exposures, interbank lending or trade of derivatives. 
Apart from the “fundamental-based contagion” channels, portfolio rebalancing theory and 
information asymmetries among market participants might induce spillover effects as well.  
                 Our empirical framework is based on a medium-size vector autoregressive model with 
exogenous variables (VARX). These exogenous variables account for common global and regional 
trends that allow us to identify and to measure the systemic contribution of sovereigns and banks. 
We fit the model recursively based on daily log-returns of sovereign and bank CDS series over the 
period October 2009 until July 2012. The use of CDS data was partly motivated by recent studies 
which show that past CDS spreads improve the forecast quality of bond yield spreads, see e.g., 
Palladini and Portes (2011) or Fontana and Scheicher (2010) who provide a detailed discussion on 
the relationship between euro area sovereign CDSs and government bond yields. We derive 
generalised impulse response functions (GIRF) are derived as functions of residuals together with 
the interdependence coefficients. The GIRFs serve as input for inference and detection of spillovers 
in the euro area. Based on recent work by Diebold and Yilmaz (2011), we extend their methodology 
that accounts for spillover and contagion in several directions. First, instead of using the forecast 
error variance decomposition, we use the framework of generalized impulse responses. In this setup, 
we analyse the normalised potential spillover effects of an unexpected shock in each variable on 4 
 
others. We determine an optimal rolling window size for our VARX model (80 days). The “optimal” 
size is characterised by a trade-off between robustness and reliability of estimated coefficients on the 
one hand (the longer the sample the better the quality) and gaining information about a build-up of 
spillover effects over time on the other hand (by aiming for many windows of shorter samples).  
                Our  main  results  reflect  increasing  spillover  measures  and  therefore  a  high  level  of 
potential contagion before key financial market events or policy interventions during the sovereign 
debt crisis. While the contagion index amongst banks remains stable during the analysed period, 
both the contagion index of sovereigns and the overall contagion index (for both banks and 
sovereigns) trend upward. The individual net contribution of the IMF/EU program countries is 
highly elevated during the periods that precedes their respective bailout, but declines considerably 
afterwards. Spillover effects from banks to sovereigns and vice-versa trend upward in periods of 
stress, reflecting the evidence of a tightening nexus between banks and sovereigns in the euro zone.  
                 The remainder  of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss studies 
related to our research. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology utilised. Section 4 presents 
our results, Section 5 provides some empirical robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related	literature	
The main strand of literature related to our paper focuses on contagion in financial 
markets. As defined by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), contagion refers to a significant increase in 
cross-market correlation compared to the one measured during tranquil periods. They find that the 
estimated correlation increases during stress times but tends to be biased upward. If tests are not 
adjusted for  heteroskedasticity bias they result in misleading evidence of contagion. They conclude 
that a stable and elevated co-movement during both tranquil and stress times should be referred to as 
interdependence.  Allen and Gale (2000) provide an analysis of contagion caused by linkages 
between banks. When one region suffers a banking crisis, banks from other regions that hold claims 
against the affected region devalue these assets and their capital is eroded. Spillover effects from the 
affected region can trigger an infection of other adjacent regions. The extreme amplification of 
spillover effects is referred to as “contagion”. This mechanism could also be explained by self-
fulfilling expectations: if shocks from a region serve as signals that improve the prediction of shocks 
in another region then a crisis in the former creates the expectation of a crisis in the latter. 
                In this paper, we propose a new methodology that complements contagion methodologies 
developed by Caceres et al. (2010), Caporin et al. (2012), Claeys and Vašíček (2012), De Santis 
(2012), Donati (2011) and Zhang et al. (2011). Dungey et al. (2004) provide an exhaustive review of 
the empirical methods that deal with financial contagion. Analysing bond spreads of the euro area 
countries, De Santis (2012) finds that global, country-specific and contagion risks are the main 
factors that drive sovereign credit spreads. Based on a multivariate model with time-varying 5 
 
correlations and volatilities, Zhang et al. (2011) use CDS spreads to infer joint and conditional 
probabilities of default of the euro-area countries. Furthermore, Caceres  et al. (2010)  use the 
methodology developed by Segoviano (2006) by estimating the spillover coefficients for each 
country in the euro area. Their findings suggest that the gravity center of contagion source shifted 
from countries that were at the beginning more affected by the financial crisis (i.e. Ireland, 
Netherlands, and Austria) to those euro area countries with weak long-term sustainability and high 
short-term refinancing risk (i.e. Greece, Portugal and Spain). Caporin et al. (2012) study sovereign 
risk contagion within the euro area countries. They find that contagion in Europe remained subdued 
in the period they analyse. They conclude that the common shift observed in CDS spreads is the 
outcome of the usual interdependence and that the strength in propagation mechanisms has not 
changed during the recent crisis. Similar to Favero and Giavazzi (2002), our model is embedded into 
a vector autoregressive framework that is able to capture interdependencies between variables in the 
system, taking into account their lagged dynamics. Bakaert et al. (2005) analyse contagion across 
international equity markets. They use a two-factor asset pricing model and provide evidence for 
global and regional market integration. Furthermore, they decompose sources of volatility into 
global, regional and local and measure their weights. 
                A critical issue that has to be solved before pursuing any econometric inference is how to 
account for common shocks and to obtain idiosyncratic residuals. Our model is inspired by the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), where asset returns are determined by a set of common factors and 
several characteristics related to idiosyncratic (non-diversifiable) risk. The second strand of literature 
associated with our paper is related to common factors in asset returns. Berndt and Obreja (2010) 
study the determinants of European corporate CDS returns and identify as one of the main common 
factors the super-senior tranche of the iTraxx Europe index, referred to as “the economic catastrophe 
risk”. Longstaff et al. (2011) analyse the determinants of sovereign credit risk and divide them into 
local economic variables, global financial market variables, global risk premium, and net investment 
flows into global funds. They find evidence that sovereign credit risk is driven mainly by global 
financial market variables or a global risk premium and to a lesser extent by local macroeconomic 
variables. Similar, by analysing sovereign CDS spreads in the US and Europe, Ang and Longstaff 
(2011)  show that systemic sovereign risk is more related to financial markets than to country-
specific macro-characteristics. Beirne and Fratzscher (2012)  find evidence for “wake-up call” 
contagion, suggesting that global financial markets are more influenced by economic fundamentals 
during periods of stress than in tranquil times. In contrast, regional contagion is less able to explain 
sovereign risks. Ejsing and Lemke (2011) investigate the co-movements of CDS spreads of euro 
area countries and banks with a common risk factor and find that sovereign CDS series became more 
sensitive to the common risk factor than banks’ CDS spreads. These findings motivate our choice for 
using several global and regional common factors, in order to “filter” the CDS returns.  
                Kalbaska and Gatwoski (2012) study contagion among several European sovereigns using 6 
 
                                                      
3 The starting point was influenced by the availability of exogenous variables (i.e. iTRAXX SovX Western Europe index). 
This period also coincides with the first signs of sovereign debt issues related to Greece. 
CDS data. They employ a correlation analysis and find that countries under stress (such as Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy) tend to trigger very few or no contagion among the core countries 
during their analysed period. Our results show that the potential spillovers from Spain and Italy, 
especially during the developments until July 2012, might be a “game-changer” from this 
perspective. We find that after the establishment of the EFSF in 2010 core countries are highly 
sensitive to shocks from periphery countries.  Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2011 and 2012) introduce 
and develop a framework based on forecast error variance decomposition for vector autoregressive 
(VAR) models. They implement their framework to equity markets and across different asset 
classes, building both on total and on “directional” volatility spillover measures.  Among other 
results, they find that equity markets had an important contribution in transmitting spillovers to 
international markets and other asset classes. Claeys and Vašíček (2012) use a similar econometric 
framework as Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) and apply it to EU sovereign bond spreads relative to the 
German Bund. Their results show that spillover among sovereign yields increased considerably 
since 2007 but its importance is different across countries. They find that spillover effects dominate 
the domestic fundamental factors for EMU countries. Finally, Alter and Schüler (2012)  find 
evidence for contagion from banks to sovereign CDS before public rescue programs for the financial 
sector were launched whereas sovereign CDS spreads do spillover to bank CDS series thereafter. 
3. Econometric	methodology	and	data	description	
In order to capture potential spillovers that could trigger financial contagion across the 
euro area, we apply an econometric framework based on daily sovereign and bank CDS spreads, see 
Appendix A1 for details about the data.
  In addition we use a number of exogenous control variables. 
The CDS data series considered refer to senior five year spreads denominated in USD (for 
sovereigns) and in EUR (for banks). Our sample starts in October 2009 and ends on 3 July 2012.
3 
Tests for unit roots suggest that the series are difference-stationary. Table A1.2 summarizes the main 
statistical characteristics of the data in log-levels and in first differences. In order to obtain time-
varying parameters we decide to use a rolling-window estimation approach similar to that by 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2011). Since in our framework the rolling window size is 80 days, the first 
estimation point refers to end of January 2010.  
3.1	Vector	autoregressive	model	with	exogenous	variables	(VARX)	
          We write a vector autoregressive model amended by several exogenous variables as:  
 7 
 
                                                      
4 We choose two lags based on several criteria: should be consistent across variables and across time and more lags 
translates into a larger estimation window size.  
5 With the exception of Finland and Ireland. For these two countries CDS data for banks is not available over a meaningful 
sample length. Bank variables together with exogenous variables are described in Table A1.1 in Appendix A1. Bank 
country-specific indices are weighted by assets of the component banks. 
6 As a robustness check, we have also estimated our analysis in a two-step setup: first regressing the CDS returns on the 
common factors and control variables and second estimating a simple VAR model between the residuals from the first step. 
There are no significant differences in our results.  
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In our case, we estimate a VARX model with two lags (p=2) for the endogenous variables and 
contemporaneous exogenous variables (q=0).
4 The vector of endogenous (y) variables consists of 
first log-differences of daily CDS spreads from eleven euro-area countries: Austria (AT), Belgium 
(BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the 
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and Spain (ES). Together with the sovereign CDS spreads we use 
in each of the above mentioned countries an aggregated index for the domestic banks.
5 As a vector 
of exogenous variables (i.e.     ) we utilise several control factors in first differences:  the iTraxx 
WE SovX index (as the main common factor of the Eurozone sovereign CDS spreads), the iTraxx 
Senior Financials Europe index (as the main common factor of the European bank CDS spreads), 
the iTraxx Europe index (that refers to 125 European investment grade companies across all sectors, 
including financials, that incorporates the overall credit performance of the Eurozone’s real 
economy), the iTraxx Crossover (that refers to 50 European companies with high yields/sub-
investment grade, that refers to lower quality credit instrument for the real economy), the spread 
between 3 month Euribor and EONIA (a common measure of the interbank risk premium), the 
EuroStoxx 50 index (the representative European stock index), the US and the UK sovereign CDS 
series and the VIX index (that is based on S&P 500 option prices and it is regarded as a common 
measure of investors’ risk aversion). As discussed in the previous section, by including the 
exogenous variables, we attempt to account for common/systematic factors, both regional and 
global, that affect at the same time all sovereign and bank CDS spreads. After accounting for all 
explanatory variables (the lagged endogenous variables and the exogenous control variables), the 
remaining residuals u from eq (1) represent the isolated idiosyncratic part. The explicit model with 
bank and sovereign variables is presented in Appendix A2.A.
6 
3.2	Generalized	impulse	response	functions	(GIRF)	
             Impulse response analysis provides a dynamic perspective of the interactions between the 
endogenous variables of the VARX process. It takes into account both the variance-covariance 8 
 
                                                      
7 In the context of financial markets, it is difficult to assume a certain identification structure (like in the case of the monetary 
policy) and to use either Choleski decomposition or the non-factorized impulse responses.    
8 Following Lütkepohl (2007), we present in Appendix A2.B the steps towards a moving average (MA) representation of the 
VAR model. 
9 By using this normalisation, changes in volatility have no impact on our potential contagion measures and we can compare 
our results across variables and across time. 
matrix if the residuals and the estimated γ-coefficients from the VARX model (1).
7 
Using the framework proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), we specify the 
generalized impulse responses function (GIRF).
8 The generalized impulse response function can be 
written as: 
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       where    represents the matrix of moving average coefficients at lag n, which can be calculated 
in a recursive way from the VARX coefficient matrices (see Appendix A2.B); 	   denotes the 
variance-covariance matrix of the residuals;     ,   
 
 
   is the standard deviation related to the error of 
shock variable. The selection vector chooses the first variable as the impulse variable. The 
interpretation of the impulse responses is analogue to the interpretation of semi-elasticities. For 
instance, an impulse or a shock in variable ES (in period t=0) means a unit increase in the structural 
error that leads to an increase of the respective CDS series by      ,   
 
   per cent. 
The quantitative measure of potential spillover effects is computed as the average cumulated 
response of a variable in the following week, as percentage of the initial shock to the impulse 
variable (i.e. we normalise by the standard deviation of the impulse variable at day t=0).
9 The 
average cumulated response of variable    to a shock in the impulse variable    is computed as the 
mean of the cumulated responses at day t=0, day t=1 and day t=5: 
    →    
   
      ∑    
       
     ∑    
       
   
   .   (3)
The averaging of the cumulated responses from these three days (over the following week) does 
incorporate  feedback effects from the two lags of the impulse variable and by including the 
temporary or persistent long-run effect of a potential shock.  
 
3.3	The	spillover	matrix	
Similar as in the framework described by Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) for the forecast error variance 
decomposition, we derive the impulse responses (IRs) from each variable to all other variables in the 
system and define the spillover matrix. Notice that substituting the forecast error variance 9 
 
                                                      
10 We will not take into account the main diagonal values in computing the average potential spillover (i.e. the Contagion 
Index and its components). 
decomposition with the impulse responses from the GIRF framework would not change the basic 
economic implications of the results. In other words, we construct a matrix of potential spillover 
effects from each variable in the system (i.e. each variable is ordered first). These possible spillover 
effects answer the question “How would variable    (column variable) evolve in the following week 
if variable    increases by one standard deviation?” On each line of this matrix we write the 
responses of the other variables from a shock in the variable on the main diagonal (values on the 
main diagonal are set to zero).
10 
Table 1: The Spillover Matrix 
             Response 
Shock 
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Note: Row variables are the origin of the unexpected shock. Column variables are the respondents or spillover receivers. 
CI represents the contagion index, calculated as the average response in the spillover matrix.  
The potential spillover effects are aggregated on each line and column and represent the total OUT 
and the total IN as potential contributions to contagion from and to each variable.  
Furthermore, based on the spillover matrix, we define several measures that allow for inference of 
the systemic contribution of each variable or the total spillover in the system.  
Let us first define the individual OUT spillover effects as the average sum of the impulse responses 
to others: 
     ,  →∗  	
 
   ∑     →  
 
  1
   
 .  (4)
Second we define the individual spillover IN effects as the average sum of the impulse responses 
from others: 
    ,∗→    	
 
   ∑     →  
 
  1
   
 .  (5)
Similar to net exports from the international trade, we define the bilateral net spillover effect  as the 
difference between the impulse responses sent and received from/to another variable: 10 
 
                                                      
11 We relax this condition below in section 5.3 and discuss some implications. Results remain qualitatively very similar. 
     ,  →    	     →    	    →   .  (6)   
The net measure in eq. (6) enables us to distinguish between pure covariance spillovers and feedback 
effects. The net spillover effects represent the amplification contribution of the first two lags of the 
impulse variable to the response variable. 
Bilateral net spillover effects for a pair of sovereigns can either be negative or positive and have the 
property that      ,  →           ,  →    0 . Using      ,  →  for each variable, we can set up a 
net spillover matrix that has the property of being anti-symmetric. This matrix shows the net 
potential spillover from     →    and vice-versa.  
The total bilateral net spillover effects for variable    is the sum of its bilateral net effects:  
      ,    	∑      →    	    →  
	
  :       ∑      ,  →  
 
     .  (7)
The sum of all       ,   in the system is equal to zero. In order to get the systemic contribution of 
each variable, we define the total net positive (TNP) spillover of the system. TNP spillover is the 
sum across all variables of their total net spillover effects (eq (7)) if       ,   is positive:  
              	∑       ,  
 
   ,
      ,    
 .  (8)
Now we can introduce the systemic contribution of each variable    in our system as the ratio 
between the individual total net contagion effects and the total net positive spillover of the system 
 
      	
      ,  
            
 .  (9)
3.4	Contagion	indices	
Next, we introduce the contagion index of the system (here for sovereigns and banks) as 
    
   
      ∑∑    →yj    
 
  1  .  (10)
If we restrict the cumulative impulse responses in the interval [0, 1], our index will be bound 
between 0 and 100.
11 It shows the average potential spillover effects in our system, based on the 
previous 80-days interdependencies.  When we relate to the total Contagion Index, we use the term 
“Contagion Index of sovereigns and banks” (i.e. CI sovs and banks). This index can be further 
decomposed into four main averaged components: CI-sovs (for the spillover among sovereigns), CI-
banks  (for the spillover among banks), CI from banks to sovs (for the spillover from banks to 
sovereigns) and CI from sovs to banks (for the spillover from sovereigns to banks). Let M be the 
number of sovereigns and P the number of banks (where M+P=N, the total number of endogenous 
variables), and sovereigns ordered first, then: 11 
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Finally,  CI of sovereigns and banks can be re-written as the weighted average of its four 
components (see eq (19) in Appendix A3). 
4  Results	
               This  Section  presents  our  main  empirical  results  along  two  dimensions:  dealing  with 
simultaneity i.e. interaction between sectors and their entities; and addressing dynamics of time-
varying parameters of the underlying rolling window models. First we show the spillover index “in 
action” by looking for example at the effects from Spanish sovereign CDS to all other variables in 
the system at two single points in time, i.e. focusing on a single sample window as a 
“snapshot”.   Next we extend the static dimension to a dynamic analysis. We present empirical 
results for the contagion index for each point in time over the entire sample. Moreover we discuss 
systemic contributions of individual sovereign CDS to the total contagion index and we demonstrate 
how the indicators are evolving before and after key market and policy events. Finally we suggest a 
method to identify and determine thresholds for “excessive spillover” i.e. the threshold beyond 
which we identify acute risks of contagion.  
4.1	A	static	perspective	
                We start our empirical analysis with the framework introduced in the previous section, by 
estimating spillover effects for individual points in time. 
4.1.1	An	illustrative	example:	The	case	of	Spanish	sovereign	CDS	
                We present the results of isolated sample windows by focusing on Spanish sovereign CDS 
as impulse variable. The responses of other variables are compared over two static periods: at 13 
January 2012 (based on the estimation period end of July 2011 - January 2012 i.e. 2011H2) and 15 
June 2012 (based on the estimation period January 2012 until beginning of June 2012 i.e. 2011H1). 
The quantitative measure of a potential spillover effect is the cumulated response of a variable as 
percentage of the shock to the impulse variable. Two aspects are analysed: the impact of a shock in 
Spanish sovereign CDS on other sovereign CDS spreads; and the impact on CDS of bank groups in 
various countries. 
              Figure 1 shows the potential cumulative impact on sovereign CDS spreads in response to a 
shock in Spanish CDS. The magnitude of spillover effects to Italian sovereign CDS decreased in the 
first half of 2012, from 83% to 68%. An unexpected shock of 100 bps to Spanish sovereign CDS 12 
 
would, therefore, translate into a 68 bps increase in Italian sovereign CDS over the following week 
(compared to nearly 83 bps in 2011H2). The potential spillover to other sovereign CDS has, however,
increased dramatically during 2012H1. The biggest relative increase from 2011 to 2012 is the spillover 
to German CDS, which has grown by factor 22, from 2% to 44%. In absolute terms, the potential 
spillover is the highest in the case of French CDS (85%, up from 26%) and Austrian CDS (76%, up 
from 30%). Similar in the case of Italy, we notice that spillovers to Ireland and Greece have decreased. 
We therefore conclude that the potential impact on “Non-Core” countries decreased (with the 
exception of Portugal) at the expense of a higher potential impact on “Core” countries. Figure 2 shows 
the expected cumulated impact of a shock in other countries’ CDS to Spanish sovereign CDS, again for 
both periods. As can be seen, the reverse spillover effects to Spanish sovereign CDS are different, in 
most cases (sometimes even qualitatively when comparing over the two periods, see e.g. Portugal). In 
other words, these results translate into a positive net potential spillover from Spanish sovereign CDS 
to the other sovereign CDS spreads, showing the increased systemic relevance of the Spanish CDS 
spread in 2012H1. 
Figure 1:  Potential impact of a Spanish CDS shock 
on other sovereign CDS changes 
Figure 2:  Potential impact on Spanish sovereign CDS 
from a shock in the other sovereign CDS  
Note: The results can be read as follows: (left-panel) for example a 100 bps unexpected shock in the Spanish CDS would 
increase the French CDS by almost 30 bps (in the first period) and 85bps (in the second one); (right-panel) for example a 
100 bps unexpected shock in the French CDS would increase the Spanish CDS by almost 20 bps (in the first period) and 40 
bps (in the second one). Impact refers to the average cumulated impulse responses in the following week.
  
The potential spillover effects from Italian to Spanish CDS (see Figure 2) did not change and 
remained at around 67% in both periods. Hence, the results in Figure 2 can be interpreted as a 
successful robustness check for the validity of the economic interpretations of the estimated spillover 
measures. The potential impact of a shock in Irish, Greek or Portuguese sovereign CDS decreased in 
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Note: Potential impact refers to the average cumulated impulse responses in the following week. 
 
                                                      
12 Although we consider Greece in our analysis, results for GR should be interpreted with caution since the CDS spreads 
reached implausible traded quotes and the Private Sector Involvement (PSI) program distorted these asset prices during 
2012H1. 
13 Group 1 (ES_bks_G1) consists of Banco Santander and BBVA, and the banks in Group 2 (ES_bks_G2) are Banco Pastor, 
Banco Popolar Espnol, Caja de Ahorros, Banco Sabadell and BANKIA. See Appendix A1 for a complete list of the country-
specific bank CDS groups used. 
 
2012H1 compared to 2011H2.
12  
                 Turning to the potential spillover effects from Spanish sovereign CDS to bank CDSs, the 
development since 2011 is even more dramatic as can be seen in Figure 3. Here we split into two 
categories of Spanish banks by distinguishing the two large and complex banking groups from the 
others. 
13 Apart from the Spanish banks, the impact of a shock to Spanish sovereign CDS is largest for 
Italian banks, which increased from 14% in 2011 to 48% over the second period. The impact on 
German bank CDS has increased by more than factor six, from 5% up to 34%. In the recent debt 
crisis a fundamental problem is the feedback loop between domestic banks and their sovereign. Our 
analysis shows strong evidence this mechanism. The potential spillover effects from a shock in the 
Spanish sovereign CDS to Spanish G1 banks have increased dramatically: 51% in 2012H1 compared 
to 17% in the 2011H2. Similarly, but slightly less, the impact of a shock to Spanish G2 banks has 
increased to 26%, compared to 11% in 2011. With regard to the robustness check, the same applies as 
with the effects of sovereigns on Spanish CDS. Results in Figure 4 show that the potential effects 
from individual bank CDSs on Spanish sovereign CDS are much less pronounced than vice versa, but 
they nevertheless increased as well in 2012H1 from close to zero (in 2011H2), in nearly all cases. 
Figure 3: Potential impact of a shock in Spanish 
sovereign CDS on bank CDSs 
Figure 4:  Potential impact of a shock from banks on 
Spanish sovereign CDS 
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4.1.2	A	snapshot	of	spillover	matrices‐	the	use	of	heat‐maps	
Table 2 and Table 3 present the entire picture on 21 June 2012, for all variables in the system.
14   
In Table 2 shocks feed from row variables to column variables. Each row shows the spillover effects of 
an impulse to the variable in the first column. The responding variables are highlighted on the top row. 
In the last column (Sum OUT) we aggregate the total potential spillover sent (     ,  →∗ , see eq (4) 
by each row variable and on the bottom row (Sum IN) we aggregate the total spillover received 
(    ,∗	→  	), see eq (6) by each column variable.  
The four quadrants represent potential spillover effects: among sovereigns (top-left), among banks 
(bottom-right), from sovereigns to banks (top-right) and from banks to sovereigns (bottom-left). Greece 
and Greek banks have almost no impact on the rest of the variables, while they receive substantial 
spillover. 
Table 3 presents the net spillover effects for each pair of variables i.e. the difference between the 
spillovers sent and received by the row variable to the column variable. Looking at the net spillover 
matrix on 21 June 2012, Spain ranks first, based on the total net spillover       ,  , see eq. (7), (the 
sum of net spillover effects to all variables in the “Sum NET” column). Among banking groups, 
German banks (DE_bks, ranked second) have an important influence on the rest of the system, with a 
net spillover of 4.34. Although French banks (FR_bks) have a negative total net spillover and therefore 
being net receivers of potential spillovers, they intermediate the largest potential spillover flow (the 
sum of      ,  →∗ and     ,∗	→  	 in Table 2), corresponding to eq. (4) and (5).  
                                                      
14 In order to be consistent across all countries, Spanish banks are merged in a single group. A similar snapshot is available 
in Appendix A4 (Table A4.1 and Table A4.2) at the end of July 2011. A detailed description of the inference based on the 
two types of matrices and a comparison between the two periods is provided in subsection 5.3.3. 15 
 
Table 2: The spillover matrix of EA sovereigns and banks (on 21 June  2012) 
 
Note: Variables in the first column are the impulse origin. Variables on the top row are the respondents to the shock. Values in the matrix represent the average cumulated spillover effect over the first 5 
days. The intensity of a shock on a respondent is marked by different levels of colour (white means no impact and intense red means very strong impact). The cumulative impact is bound between 0 and 1. A 
value of 0.5 means that the response variable would be impacted in the same direction with an intensity of 50% the initial unexpected shock in the impulse variable. If the initial shock has a magnitude of 10 
bps then the response variable is expected to increase by 5 bps in the following week. In the last column we have the aggregated impact sent (Sum OUT) by each row variable and on the bottom row the 
aggregated spillover received (Sum IN) by each column variable. The bottom-right cell (in bold) shows total spillover in the system (by dividing this value to the total number of non-diagonal cells i.e. 20x19 
we obtain the contagion index of EA sovereigns and banks, as introduced in eq. (10)). The results for GR and GR_bks should be interpreted with caution since the CDS spreads reached implausible traded 
quotes during this period. 
      Response 
Impulse AT BE FI FR GR DE IE IT NL PT ES AT_bks BE_bks FR_bks GR_bks DE_bks IT_bks NL_bks PT_bks ES_bks
Sum 
OUT
AT . 0.83 0.82 0.99 0.00 0.74 0.51 0.87 0.75 0.64 0.52 0.24 0.18 0.57 0.00 0.16 0.33 0.23 0.09 0.21 8.68
BE 0.74 . 0.81 0.85 0.30 0.80 0.26 0.79 0.90 0.09 0.37 0.23 0.04 0.62 0.80 0.32 0.44 0.31 0.30 0.55 9.52
FI 0.54 0.58 . 0.78 0.00 0.57 0.18 0.54 0.77 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.12 0.46 0.00 0.13 0.53 0.18 0.17 0.36 6.52
FR 0.71 0.58 0.55 . 0.03 0.69 0.09 0.58 0.39 0.50 0.33 0.10 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.03 0.10 5.57
GR 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 . 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.13
DE 0.45 0.52 0.65 0.79 0.45 . 0.02 0.44 0.45 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.08 0.05 0.00 5.18
IE 0.51 0.54 0.19 0.32 0.40 0.00 . 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.33 0.43 0.76 0.68 0.30 0.47 0.12 0.73 0.44 7.75
IT 0.87 0.92 0.78 0.85 0.41 0.76 0.36 . 0.87 0.62 0.68 0.38 0.07 0.71 0.00 0.41 0.46 0.31 0.32 0.32 10.10
NL 0.20 0.23 0.35 0.11 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.21 . 0.00 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.30 0.43 0.13 0.28 0.36 0.07 0.31 3.43
PT 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.31 0.17 0.21 0.54 0.20 0.00 . 0.04 0.15 0.17 0.52 0.37 0.24 0.22 0.08 0.36 0.10 4.20
ES 0.68 0.67 0.40 0.54 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.87 1.00 0.16 . 0.44 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.60 0.54 0.84 0.12 0.64 8.50
AT_bks 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.27 0.13 0.60 0.29 . 0.09 0.28 0.77 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.32 0.06 4.16
BE_bks 0.14 0.00 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.06 0.35 0.07 0.00 0.43 0.02 0.09 . 0.26 0.33 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.17 0.00 2.66
FR_bks 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.16 0.29 0.54 0.34 0.34 0.91 0.13 0.35 0.15 . 0.60 0.60 0.68 0.65 0.47 0.35 8.05
GR_bks 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.34 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.59
DE_bks 0.36 0.39 0.22 0.50 0.02 0.44 0.72 0.49 0.37 1.00 0.40 0.57 0.13 1.00 0.56 . 0.88 0.70 0.77 0.32 9.83
IT_bks 0.21 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.00 0.26 0.71 0.30 0.27 0.94 0.16 0.39 0.23 1.00 0.56 0.74 . 0.67 0.76 0.42 8.62
NL_bks 0.19 0.12 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.61 0.15 0.38 0.16 0.91 1.00 0.54 0.63 . 0.22 0.46 6.43
PT_bks 0.00 0.27 0.09 0.00 0.76 0.03 0.68 0.16 0.06 0.70 0.04 0.28 0.05 0.56 0.67 0.45 0.55 0.06 . 0.35 5.76
ES_bks 0.15 0.33 0.28 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.08 0.73 0.33 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.40 1.00 0.16 0.33 0.31 0.28 . 5.01
Sum IN 6.52 6.97 6.53 7.08 3.23 5.28 6.00 6.65 7.41 8.99 3.87 4.40 1.87 9.72 8.01 5.50 6.95 5.38 5.27 5.06 120.6816 
 
 
Table 3: Net Spillover matrix (on 21 June 2012) 
 
Note: If the value in the cell is negative (blue horizontal bar) it means that the row variable is the net receiver and the column variable is the net sender. If the value is positive (red horizontal bar) the column 
variable is net receiver and the row variable is net sender. The last column shows the sum of net spillover effects of the row variable. In case the NET sum spillover is positive (bold values) then the variable is a 
net sender of the system.   
Net Matrix AT BE FI FR GR DE IE IT NL PT ES AT_bks BE_bks FR_bks GR_bks DE_bks IT_bks NL_bks PT_bks ES_bks
Sum 
NET
AT 0.00 0.10 0.28 0.27 0.00 0.29 0.00 ‐0.01 0.55 0.43 ‐0.16 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.00 ‐0.20 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.06 2.16
BE ‐0.10 0.00 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.28 ‐0.29 ‐0.14 0.68 ‐0.05 ‐0.30 0.06 0.04 0.25 0.79 ‐0.07 0.17 0.19 0.03 0.22 2.55
FI ‐0.28 ‐0.23 0.00 0.22 0.00 ‐0.08 ‐0.01 ‐0.24 0.42 0.08 ‐0.17 0.15 ‐0.06 0.09 ‐0.01 ‐0.09 0.08 ‐0.06 0.08 0.07 ‐0.01
FR ‐0.27 ‐0.27 ‐0.22 0.00 0.03 ‐0.10 ‐0.23 ‐0.27 0.29 0.20 ‐0.22 0.08 ‐0.11 ‐0.04 0.00 ‐0.28 ‐0.12 0.00 0.03 0.00 ‐1.52
GR 0.00 ‐0.29 0.00 ‐0.03 0.00 ‐0.44 ‐0.39 ‐0.39 0.00 ‐0.17 0.00 0.00 ‐0.16 ‐0.16 ‐0.31 ‐0.01 0.00 0.00 ‐0.75 0.00 ‐3.09
DE ‐0.29 ‐0.28 0.08 0.10 0.44 0.00 0.02 ‐0.31 0.29 0.00 ‐0.12 0.00 ‐0.06 0.03 0.18 ‐0.21 ‐0.01 0.03 0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.10
IE 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.23 0.39 ‐0.02 0.00 ‐0.04 0.00 0.45 0.15 ‐0.21 0.08 0.22 0.68 ‐0.42 ‐0.24 ‐0.05 0.05 0.18 1.75
IT 0.01 0.14 0.24 0.27 0.39 0.31 0.04 0.00 0.66 0.42 ‐0.18 0.11 0.00 0.37 0.00 ‐0.08 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.23 3.45
NL ‐0.55 ‐0.68 ‐0.42 ‐0.29 0.00 ‐0.29 0.00 ‐0.66 0.00 0.00 ‐0.84 0.01 0.00 ‐0.05 0.35 ‐0.24 0.01 0.07 0.02 ‐0.42 ‐3.99
PT ‐0.43 0.05 ‐0.08 ‐0.20 0.17 0.00 ‐0.45 ‐0.42 0.00 0.00 ‐0.12 ‐0.46 ‐0.25 ‐0.39 0.37 ‐0.76 ‐0.72 ‐0.53 ‐0.34 ‐0.23 ‐4.79
ES 0.16 0.30 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.12 ‐0.15 0.18 0.84 0.12 0.00 0.15 ‐0.02 0.62 0.00 0.21 0.38 0.69 0.07 0.57 4.63
AT_bks ‐0.04 ‐0.06 ‐0.15 ‐0.08 0.00 0.00 0.21 ‐0.11 ‐0.01 0.46 ‐0.15 0.00 0.00 ‐0.07 0.77 ‐0.41 ‐0.29 ‐0.23 0.04 ‐0.12 ‐0.24
BE_bks ‐0.04 ‐0.04 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.06 ‐0.08 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.33 ‐0.03 ‐0.14 ‐0.08 0.12 ‐0.02 0.79
FR_bks ‐0.19 ‐0.25 ‐0.09 0.04 0.16 ‐0.03 ‐0.22 ‐0.37 0.05 0.39 ‐0.62 0.07 ‐0.11 0.00 0.60 ‐0.40 ‐0.31 ‐0.25 ‐0.10 ‐0.05 ‐1.68
GR_bks 0.00 ‐0.79 0.01 0.00 0.31 ‐0.18 ‐0.68 0.00 ‐0.35 ‐0.37 0.00 ‐0.77 ‐0.33 ‐0.60 0.00 ‐0.56 ‐0.56 ‐0.95 ‐0.66 ‐0.93 ‐7.42
DE_bks 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.28 0.01 0.21 0.42 0.08 0.24 0.76 ‐0.21 0.41 0.03 0.40 0.56 0.00 0.14 0.16 0.32 0.17 4.34
IT_bks ‐0.12 ‐0.17 ‐0.08 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.24 ‐0.17 ‐0.01 0.72 ‐0.38 0.29 0.14 0.31 0.56 ‐0.14 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.09 1.67
NL_bks ‐0.04 ‐0.19 0.06 0.00 0.00 ‐0.03 0.05 ‐0.20 ‐0.07 0.53 ‐0.69 0.23 0.08 0.25 0.95 ‐0.16 ‐0.05 0.00 0.16 0.15 1.05
PT_bks ‐0.09 ‐0.03 ‐0.08 ‐0.03 0.75 ‐0.02 ‐0.05 ‐0.17 ‐0.02 0.34 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 ‐0.12 0.10 0.66 ‐0.32 ‐0.21 ‐0.16 0.00 0.07 0.49
ES_bks ‐0.06 ‐0.22 ‐0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 ‐0.18 ‐0.23 0.42 0.23 ‐0.57 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.93 ‐0.17 ‐0.09 ‐0.15 ‐0.07 0.00 ‐0.0517 
 
4.2	The	dynamics	of	potential	spillover	effects	
             In this sub-section we extend the snapshot perspective from Section 4.1 to a dynamic analysis. 
We analyse the responses from a shock in Spanish sovereign CDS based on a 80-day rolling-window. 
First, we start with a model that consists only of sovereign CDS changes. Second, we estimate a 
model with both sovereigns and banks, similar to eq (15) presented in Appendix A2. 
4.2.1	Time‐varying	impact	on	euro	area	sovereigns	–	the	case	of	Spain	
             Using  a  80-day  rolling  window,  we estimate the VARX coefficients and the residuals 
recursively. We further obtain the dynamics of the cumulated impact on euro-area sovereigns. In 
Figure 5 we present our results of the impulse response analysis from a shock in ES sovereign CDS. 
We aggregate the impact on three different groups: “Non-core” (GR, IE, IT, and PT), Euro-area (AT, 
BE, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, NL and PT) and “Core” countries (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, and NL). Each 
group index is a GDP weighted average of the individual responses. Static analysis has already 
signalled an increase in the interdependence between Spain and “Core” countries and an untightening 
the relationships within the “Non-core” countries in 2012H1. This trend reverses at the end of June 
2012, after the G20 meeting and EU summit. 
 
Figure 5: The dynamics of the cumulated potential impact on CDS spreads of “Non-core” countries group (red), 
euro-area (black) and “Core” countries group (green) from a shock in the Spanish sovereign CDS  
	
Note: “Core” refers to the average impact on AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, and NL weighted by GDP; “EA” refers to the average 
impact on the entire sample of Eurozone countries: AT, BE, FI, FR, GR, DE, IE, IT, NL, and PT weighted by GDP; “Non-
core” refers to the average impact on GR, IE, IT and PT weighted by GDP. 
There is clear evidence that the “Non-core” countries are more sensitive to a shock in the Spanish 
CDS than “Core” countries. An interesting result of our analysis is that during times of “distress” the 
gap between the two groups narrows while during tranquil episodes the gap widens. The amplification 
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of potential contagion can be seen as a result of increased interdependences between sovereign CDS 
spreads. 
4.2.2	Time‐varying	impact	on	European	banks	
                The average time-varying potential spillover to European banks is depicted in Figure 6. 
There we show the differences between the effects from a shock in Spanish sovereign CDS and from 
a shock in German sovereign CDS.
15 During the entire data sample the mean impact from DE is 
slightly below the mean impact from ES (15.6% compared with 16.7%).  
The average potential spillover effect on banks is the mean of a shock from the respective country 
(here e.g. ES and DE) at the end of each rolling window.
16 As can be seen in Figure 6, at the 
beginning of April 2012, the average impact from a shock in Spanish sovereign CDS exceeds the 
mean impact (over the entire period) and exceeds the previous peak that was reached at the end of 
November 2011. By mid-May 2012 the average potential spillover effects from a Spanish shock 
reaches the level of 65%. In other words, the entire European banking system reacted strongly to the 
Spanish sovereign debt crisis during the April-June 2012 period. After the G20 and EU summits, the 
potential contagion pressure to the European banking system mitigates. This analysis highlights the 
advantage of monitoring the time-varying potential impact from each variable of the system. 
 
Figure 6: Average cumulated impact on European banks from a shock in the Spanish sovereign CDS 
(“AvgESbks”, red) and from a shock in the German government CDS (“AvgDEbks”, green) 
 
Note: “AvgESbks” and “AvgDEbks” refer to the average potential impact on European banks from a shock in the Spanish 
sovereign CDS, and German sovereign CDS respectively; “MeanImpactES” and “MeanImpactDE” are the mean impact over 
the entire sample from a shock in Spanish sovereign CDS, and German sovereign CDS respectively. 
                                                      
15 We merge Spanish banks (ES_bks_G1 and ES_bks_G2) in this analysis in order not to have biased results towards 
Spanish banks i.e. to have a uniform framework across all countries. 
16 This can be refined with weights from the BIS foreign claims exposures as in eq (25) of Appendix A3. 
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4.3	The	euro	area	Contagion	Index	
4.3.1	The	euro	area	Contagion	Index	of	sovereigns	
               In this sub-section we analyse the dynamics of the Contagion Index for all sovereigns (CI-
sovs) as introduced in eq (11) and shown in Figure 7. We highlight several important events in the 
Eurozone that preceded changes in the CI-sovs.
17 We also present the sovereign CDS series in levels 
from all analysed countries (right axis, with the exception of the Greek sovereign CDS). 
During the analysed period, CI-sovs takes values between a minimum value of 15.34 (on 28 October 
2010) and a maximum level of 43.33 (on 09 June 2010). As can be seen in Figure 7, several 
news/events (e.g. policy related actions) had a decreasing impact on the index. This aspect will be 
developed in detail in sub-section 4.6. During the period related to the Spanish banking/sovereign 
debt crisis the sovereign contagion index reached a peak on 22 June 2012 (42.36) very close to the 
2010 peak. After the G20 and EU summit, the index drops to around 34 (on 3 July 2012). 
 
Figure 7: Sovereign CDS series (right axis; in basis points) and the EA Contagion Index (only for sovereigns; left 
axis; the purple-grey area) 
 
Note: “CI-sovs” is the Contagion Index of sovereigns, as introduced in eq (11). It takes values between 0 and 100. It is 
calculated as the average potential spillover effect from each sovereign to the others. The list of events marked by vertical 
lines is presented in Appendix, Table A1.4. 
4.3.2	The	euro‐area	Contagion	Index	of	sovereigns	and	banks	
               In this sub-section, we focus on the results from our joint analysis of banks and sovereigns. 
To exemplify our results we provide the contagion matrices (both in absolute and in net terms) for 
some particular dates. As previously mentioned, in this analysis, the two Spanish banking groups 
                                                      
17 The description of selected events and the exact dates are presented in Table A1.4 (in the Appendix). 
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(ES_bks_G1 and ES_bks_G2) are merged into a single group (ES_bks) in order to be consistent 
across all countries.
18  
               In the sample period under scrutiny, the Contagion Index for banks (CI-banks) takes values 
between a minimum level of 18.4 (reached on 16/02/2012, between the two LTROs) and a maximum 
level of 50.2 (on 3 Nov. 2010 around time when Ireland has seek a bailout). At the beginning and 
towards the end of our sample, CI-banks and CI-sovs are characterized by a tighter co-movement. 
During most of that period, the average potential spillovers among banks exceed those between 
sovereigns. This characteristic is reversed in the first half of 2010 and in 2012. The spillover index for 
the entire system (both banks and sovereigns) has a slight upward trend. We conclude in the following 
section that this provides evidence for an increasing interconnectedness between banks and 
sovereigns, i.e. a tightening of the nexus between these two sectors. 
 
Figure 8: EA Contagion Indices: only sovereigns (CI-sovs; black), only banks (CI-banks; red) and the entire 
system (the average potential spillover effect from the Contagion matrix; CI banks and sovs; green)  
 
Note: “CI banks and sovs”, as introduced in eq (10), is not the average of  “CI-banks” and “CI-sovs”. It summarizes the 
information from all four sub-components i.e. the entire system of banks and sovereigns, including the potential spillover 
effects from banks to sovereigns and vice-versa. 
4.3.3 The feedback loop between sovereigns and banks 
               We now turn to the indices related to spillover effects on banks from a shock in sovereign 
CDSs and vice-versa, see Figure 9 and eq (13) and (14). These two indices capture the average 
interdependence between the sovereign and the banking sector. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in 2008, governments in many countries have contributed to bailing out financial institutions. This has 
                                                      
18 Similar, the new single group of Spanish banks (ES_bks) is weighted by banks’ total assets. See Table A2. 
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implied at least a partial credit risk transfer from banks to sovereigns. Over the last two years, both 
indices increased more than twice their initial values in February 2010. At the beginning of the 
sample, the contagion index from banks to sovereigns takes a value of around eight. It reaches the 
peak level of 37, after the publication of the stress test results for the European banking industry. This 
period reflects also a widening of the gap between the two indices. On the other side, the contagion 
index from sovereigns to banks takes a value of around five at the beginning, and peaks during the 
Spanish sovereign debt crisis in June 2012, at a value of 26.9, more than five times higher than at the 
beginning of the sample.  
 
Figure 9: Average potential spillover from banks to sovereigns (red) and from sovereigns to banks (black) 
 
Note: “CI banks to sovs” refers to the average spillover effects sent by banks to sovereigns as introduced in eq (14). “CI sovs 
to banks” refers to the average spillover effects sent by sovereigns to banks as introduced in eq (13). 
4.4 The spillover and net spillover matrices 
                In this sub-section, we present both spillover and net spillover matrices of sovereigns and 
banks together with several measures of systemic relevance of our variables in the system derived 
from these matrices. For illustration we present two snapshots: first on 18 July 2011 (after bank stress 
tests results are published) and second on 21 June 2012 (after the G20 summit). At each point in time, 
both spillover matrices are based as before on an information set of past 80 days.  
Table A4.1 and Table A4.2 (in Appendix A4) show the spillover and the net spillover matrices on 18 
July 2011. The four quadrants reflect the flow of different components of the index: interactions 
between sovereigns (top-left), spillover effects from sovereigns to banks (top-right), interactions 
between banks (bottom-right) and spillover effects from banks to sovereigns. The overall picture 
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shows that stress in the banking sector impacts severely on euro-area sovereigns. The information 
related to the sent and received spillover effects together with the total flow is summarized in Table 4. 
Table 2 and Table 3 (presented in sub-section 4.1) present the contagion and the net spillover matrices 
on 21 June 2012. Compared with the two matrices from July 2011, this period is characterised by an 
overall elevated spillover level in all four quadrants. Both sovereigns and banks strongly impact on 
each other. Focusing on the net spillover matrix, we can identify the main drivers of potential 
contagion in our system. This information is presented in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
Table 4: Ranking of NET senders and receivers of 
spillover effects on the 18 July 2011 
Rank Variable     
Sum 
NET 
Sum 
OUT 
Sum 
IN 
Total 
FLOW 
1  DE_bks 
N
E
T
 
S
E
N
D
E
R
S
 
4.75  10.30  5.55  15.85 
2  IT_bks  3.29  8.12  4.83  12.95 
3  AT_bks  3.09  5.79  2.71  8.50 
4  AT  1.51  8.95  7.45  16.40 
5  BE_bks  1.01  5.16  4.15  9.32 
6  NL_bks  0.90  4.40  3.50  7.90 
7  PT_bks  0.83  8.02  7.19  15.21 
8  ES_bks  0.41  7.32  6.91  14.22 
9  PT  0.23  3.70  3.47  7.17 
10  DE  0.10  5.01  4.91  9.92 
11  BE 
N
E
T
 
R
E
C
E
I
V
E
R
S
 
-0.38  4.64  5.01  9.65 
12  NL  -0.61  4.60  5.21  9.81 
13  FR  -0.69  6.71  7.40  14.11 
14  FR_bks  -0.74  6.15  6.89  13.04 
15  FI  -0.91  1.53  2.44  3.97 
16  IE  -0.95  4.68  5.63  10.30 
17  GR_bks  -2.01  0.82  2.82  3.64 
18  ES  -2.33  5.04  7.37  12.41 
19  IT  -2.94  3.73  6.67  10.39 
20  GR  -4.58  2.00  6.58  8.57 
	
Table 5:  Ranking of NET senders and receivers of 
spillover effects on the 21 June 2012 
Rank Variable    
Sum 
NET 
Sum 
OUT 
Sum 
IN 
Total 
FLOW 
1  ES 
N
E
T
 
S
E
N
D
E
R
S
 
4.63  8.50  3.87  12.38 
2  DE_bks  4.34  9.83  5.50  15.33 
3  IT  3.45  10.10  6.65  16.75 
4  BE  2.55  9.52  6.97  16.49 
5  AT  2.16  8.68  6.52  15.20 
6  IE  1.75  7.75  6.00  13.75 
7  IT_bks  1.67  8.62  6.95  15.57 
8  NL_bks  1.05  6.43  5.38  11.81 
9  BE_bks  0.79  2.66  1.87  4.53 
10  PT_bks  0.49  5.76  5.27  11.03 
11  FI 
N
E
T
 
R
E
C
E
I
V
E
R
S
 
-0.01  6.52  6.53  13.04 
12  ES_bks  -0.05  5.01  5.06  10.07 
13  DE  -0.10  5.18  5.28  10.46 
14  AT_bks  -0.24  4.16  4.40  8.55 
15  FR  -1.52  5.57  7.08  12.65 
16  FR_bks  -1.68  8.05  9.72  17.77 
17  GR  -3.09  0.13  3.23  3.36 
18  NL  -3.99  3.43  7.41  10.84 
19  PT  -4.79  4.20  8.99  13.19 
20  GR_bks  -7.42  0.59  8.01  8.60 
Note: Variables are ordered from the highest to lowest net spillover effect in the system (in column “Rank”). In bold are the 
highest five values of total flow. 
           Tables 4 and 5 rank our variables according to the net spillover contribution to the system in 
July 2011 and at the end of June 2012. The ranking of net senders for the first period that ends on 18 
July 2011 (i.e. after the publication of the results from the EBA bank stress-testing exercise) is clearly 
dominated by banking groups. German, Italian and Austrian banks are the biggest net senders of 
spillover effects. Biggest net spillover receivers (at the bottom of the table) are sovereign CDS of 
Spain, Italy and Greece. The period (ending on 21 June 2012 after the G20 summit) is qualitatively 
remarkably different. Sorting by the net spillover effects, the top five is dominated by sovereign CDS 
spreads: Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Austria. German, Italian and Dutch banks remain in the first 10 23 
 
most important net spillover senders, but on lower positions than in the first period. At the bottom 
part, Greece, French and Greek banks seem to be the most vulnerable to potential contagion in both 
periods. This is also consistent with the peak in our Contagion Index around that period. Moreover, 
Italy, Spain and Ireland that are highly receptive to spillover effects in the first period, become top net 
senders in the second period. French and German banks seem to be among of the important nodes by 
total flow in both periods, reflecting their systemic relevance in the euro area sovereign-banking 
system. 
4.5 The systemic contribution of sovereigns 
              Next we focus more closely on the total net positive (TNP) spillover, as defined in eq (8), 
which captures the sum of net positive spillovers from all banks and sovereigns. In Figure 10 we plot 
the time-varying systemic contributions (i.e. the weight of individual net spillover in the TNP 
spillover, eq. (9)) of the IMF/EU program countries (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal; dotted lines; left-
hand scale) together with other countries being currently under stress, namely Spain and Italy (grey 
and red lines; left-hand scale).  
              As introduced in eq. (9), the systemic contribution (SC) of each variable    from our system 
is the ratio between the individual total net potential spillovers to each other variables and TNP 
spillover of the system. The SC of Greece (blue dotted line) shows most of the time negative values, 
meaning that it receives net potential spillover from the others. The SC of Ireland decreases after the 
implementation of EFSF. Furthermore, the SC of Portugal becomes negative after the implementation 
of LTRO I. The SC of Italy, Spain and Ireland fluctuate between -0.2 and 0.25. From summer 2011 
onwards, their weights have a clear upward trend. Since March 2012, Italy and Spain have a positive 
and significant SC. The main observation is that after countries receive aid from EU/IMF the overall 
systemic risk significantly decreases. This can be interpreted as a partial transfer of (tail-) risk from 
the program countries to the EFSF after the latter was established. Finally, the evolution of the TNP 
spillover follows a similar pattern compared with the contagion indices described in previous sections.    
To sum up, this analysis highlights in Figure 10 time-varying systemic contributions of several euro 
area countries from our system of banks and sovereigns together with the impact of some relevant 
events presented in Table A1.4. 24 
 
Figure 10: The systemic contributions of GR, IE, IT, ES, and PT (left axis) and the Total Net Positive (TNP) 
Spillover (right axis)      
 
Note: “TNP Spillover” (right axis) is the Total Positive Net Spillover in our system of banks and sovereigns. Time-varying 
systemic contributions of each sovereign are smoothed with the HP filter (smoothing parameter = 5000). 
 
4.6 The impact of different economic/policy events on the contagion index 
              An  important  qualitative  robustness check for any empirical approach is in-sample 
consistency (or “fit of the data”) with historical events. Here, we analyse both qualitatively and 
quantitatively the short-term impact of different events on our proposed contagion indices. Together 
with the cumulated returns of components of the contagion index, the events are summarized in Table 
A1.4. Several events had a positive effect on all four components: the establishment of the EFSF 
(Event 2), the announcement of the second CBPP (Event 6) and the 25bps rate-cut by the ECB (Event 
7; with the exception of the CI sovereigns that do not have a negative return over both +10-days 
interval and ±10-days interval). 
            The nationalization of BANKIA (Event 10) is the event that is related to the most adverse 
impact on all contagion components. There are two events that suggest evidence for a clear risk 
transfer from banks to sovereigns: when EU offers support to Greece (Event 1) and after Ireland seeks 
financial support (Event 3). We find that there are also three events in which we observe afterwards 
lower potential contagion among sovereigns and likewise from sovereigns to banks. However, at the 
same time this analysis shows an increase of the interdependency amongst banks themselves: LTRO 
II (Event 9) and Event 4, when Portugal requests activation of the aid mechanism.   
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Figure 11: The impact on spillover indices (sovereigns, banks, from banks to sovereigns, and from sovereigns to 
banks) at some specific news/policy events 
 
Note:  Each window refers to 10 days before and after the event. A list of the complete description of events and the 
cumulative returns are presented in Table A1.4 (in the Appendix A1). 
 
4.7 Critical spillover thresholds for contagion 
 
               To provide a stylised example suppose financial variable X is identified as a net spillover 
sending variable. Assume further that from an observed empirical distribution it is known how often 
that variable has increased at least n basis points over a given time unit. Finally assume, that risk of 
contagion from X to Y is a function of the magnitude with which Y reacts to a shock induced by X. 
Then there exists a threshold beyond which reactions in responses of Y are considered to be 
“excessive” and hence trigger contagion. In Table 6 we show how to apply this idea to our model. We 
first derive the empirical distribution of daily changes in CDS from a sample of more than 700 
observations and from there we take the critical magnitudes of spillover thresholds from characteristic 
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percentiles. This is presented in the left panel of Table 6 where for illustrative purposes we restrict 
ourselves to four shock-inducing variables: sovereign CDS and bank CDS (both from ES and IT).  
Obtaining a threshold spillover for contagion follows along a two-step algorithm. First, one has to 
choose a tail probability (from the left panel in Table 6) according to a subjective risk aversion. 
Second pick a subjectively tolerable increase of basis points for a shock-response variable. Table 6 
accounts for levels from 15 to 50 basis points (right hand panel). Consider, as example, first a 0.1% 
subjective tail risk probability for a Spanish government CDS (the probability of a day-to-day 
increase of more than 54 basis points). Second, assume that a tolerable magnitude for a (here day-to-
day) increase in any response variable as a response to a shock in a Spanish sovereign CDS is 20 basis 
points. The critical threshold level would then be a 37% spillover effect in eq (4) from Spanish 
sovereign CDS to any chosen variable. For a less risk averse player who chooses a subjective tail 
probability of 5% and who picks as well 20 basis points as tolerable response, the subjective threshold 
of contagion is higher, i.e. 87%.  These are two extreme examples. However, the “snapshot” taken in 
June 2012 (see Figure 1) shows that even an extreme non-risk-averse player would perceive the 
spillover effect from Spanish to French sovereign CDS (bigger than 90%) as risk of contagion. Risk-
averse players who fear contagion at much lower spillover levels would conclude to observe strong 
evidence for contagion in June 2012 as the threshold of 37% is passed for almost all variables.
 19 
 
                                                      
19 In a more sophisticated way we will simulate critical values based on Monte Carlo techniques. We leave this for future 
research. 
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Table 6: Critical spillover levels for contagion of an unexpected shock in the impulse variable: A. Spanish (ES) 
sovereign CDS; B. Italian (IT) sovereign CDS; C. Spanish banks (ES_bks) CDS; and D. Italian banks (IT_bks) 
CDS  
 
Note: Historical probabilities of events refer to our analysed period: October 2009 – July 2012, 717 observations in total. We 
do not report any spillover thresholds of the response variable above 200%.  
5  Robustness	and	motivation	of	setup	parameters	
               To assess the sensitivity of choices and assumptions with respect to the specification of our 
model we apply several robustness checks. We discuss the optimal rolling window size and the 
potentially time-varying distributions of residuals from the estimated VARX system.  
Shock variable
15 20 30 40 50
Tail event
(daily change)
A. ES sovereign CDS 
0.1% 54 28% 37% 56% 74% 93%
0.5% 47 32% 43% 64% 85% 106%
1% 36 42% 56% 83% 111% 139%
2% 29 52% 69% 103% 138% 172%
5% 23 65% 87% 130% 174% -
B. IT sovereign CDS 
0.1% 72 21% 28% 42% 56% 69%
0.5% 52 29% 38% 58% 77% 96%
1% 41 37% 49% 73% 98% 122%
2% 32 47% 63% 94% 125% 156%
5% 22 68% 91% 136% 182% -
C. ES banks CDS 
0.1% 47 32% 43% 64% 85% 106%
0.5% 35 43% 57% 86% 114% 143%
1% 30 50% 67% 100% 133% 167%
2% 27 56% 74% 111% 148% 185%
5% 20 75% 100% 150% 200% -
D. IT banks CDS 
0.1% 55 27% 36% 55% 73% 91%
0.5% 46 33% 43% 65% 87% 109%
1% 37 41% 54% 81% 108% 135%
2% 30 50% 67% 100% 133% 167%
5% 20 75% 100% 150% 200% -
 cumulative increase (over one week)
Historical 
probability 
of events
Response variable
 observed lower bound 
increase of bps
Critical level (in bps)
Spillover thresholds28 
 
5.1	Optimal	rolling	window	size	
                The minimum sample size of any estimation period is dependent on the number of variables 
in the system including the order of lags. For the identification of an “optimal” rolling window size 
there is a trade-off between robustness and reliability of estimated VAR coefficients (the longer the 
sample the better the quality) on the one hand, and gaining information about a build-up of spillover 
effects over time (the shorter the sample window the larger the weight on more recent information) on 
the other hand. Against this trade-off we combine the results of the following functions. First, in the 
estimated VAR in eq. (1) at least one of the two γ-coefficients (corresponding to a lag length of two) 
of a shock variable has to be significant. Since we are interested in the percentage of significant γ-
coefficients of the shock variable in the equations of response variables, we apply a joint test under 
the null hypothesis that γ and γ  are simultaneously zero. In Figure 12 we present the percentage of 
tests that reject the null hypothesis of the joint test as a function of the window sample size. 
                Second,  our  aim  is  that measured spillover effects integrate potentially adverse 
developments for financial stability. As the sample size of the window increases the weight of new 
information decreases and spillover effects reflect new developments with a lag effect. We account 
for this aspect by computing the mean of residual sum of squares (MRSS). Since this function 
increases with the rolling window size, we are interested in the marginal change of the MRSS. 
By finding the intersection of these two functions, we obtain an optimal rolling window size between 
80 and 85 days. An illustrative representation of the two criteria is presented in Figure 12. 
Figure 12: Optimal size of the rolling window 
   
Note:  On X-axis: rolling window size in number of days. 
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5.2	Differences	in	distributions	of	residuals	
               Furthermore, we show the results for the residuals’ distributions over time. In order to check 
whether these distributions change, we employ the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS test)
20 test 
to compare whether the distribution at any time=t is different from the distribution 80 days before. 
Figure 13 presents the results and persistence of the test rejection in the analysed sample. The first test 
refers to the observation in June 2010 that is compared with our first distribution at the end of January 
2010. 
Figure 13: Rejection of the Null hypothesis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test 
 
Note: The test compares the sample of the VAR residuals at time t with the sample of the residuals from the VAR estimated 
80days before. Values of 1(blue bars) refer to the rejection of the null hypothesis (i.e. same distribution for the two samples) 
at 1% confidence level. 
There are at least three different regimes in our sample. In order to get a more detailed picture about 
the time-varying distributions we present in Figure 14 the second, third and fourth moment of the 
empirical distribution of the residuals. These results motivate our choice of a VAR with time-varying 
parameters, since there is clear evidence of structural breaks. 
Figure 14: Moments of the sample distributions of residuals from the VAR model estimated at time t 
 
Note: Variance and kurtosis (Left-axis) and skewness (Right-axis). 
 
                                                      
20	KS test compares the distributions of two data samples. The null hypothesis is that both samples are from the same 
continuous distribution. The alternative hypothesis is that they are from different continuous distributions. If the result is 1 
the test rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level; and if is 0 the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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5.3	Relaxing	restrictions	imposed	on	impulse	responses	
                 In  the  analysis  above,  when  estimation  the  Contagion  Index  and  its  components  we 
restricted the IRs to take values in the [0,1] interval. We relax the restriction imposed on the impulse 
response functions and Figure 15 shows that results do not change dramatically. In particular, in stress 
periods the differences are very small, while in calm periods the [0,1] restriction yields a higher 
contagion index. 
 
Figure 15: The Contagion Index with restricted and unrestricted IRs 
 
Note: The restriction imposed on the cumulative impulse responses is to be bounded by the [0,1] interval. 
 
6  Conclusion	and	Outlook		
  During the recent sovereign debt crisis a prominent theme discussed by academics, policy 
makers and market participants is that of contagion. There is an urgent need for tools and instruments 
to provide reliable information - in particular for policy makers - to take effective and efficient policy 
measures. New tools for the measurement of contagion and spillover effects will have the potential for 
playing an important role for monitoring and identifying systemic risks.  
               In this paper we present an empirical framework that is able to quantify spillover effects. 
Based on standard VAR techniques we use generalised impulse response functions to calculate 
spillover indices. Following the definition of contagion by Allen and Gale (2012) who interpret 
contagion as a consequence of excess spillover, we propose a method to construct contagion indices 
based on measures for aggregated spillover effects. We define spillover as the transmission of an 
unexpected but identified shock from one variable to receiving or responding variables in the system. 
Aggregation of net spillover effects at each point in time yields then a contagion index. We apply our 
method to investigate interactions between banks and sovereigns and use their CDS spreads as 
market-based asset prices from a typically liquid market. The contagion index proposed in this paper 
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can be disentangled into four components which signal excess spillover i) amongst sovereigns, ii) 
amongst banks, iii) from sovereigns to banks, iv) vice-versa. By using a rolling-window estimation 
technique we are able to capture changes of interdependencies over time, in quasi-real time, which 
allows us to gauge effectiveness of policy interventions.  
               Our measure can be used in a static or dynamic context, by showing the state of potential 
contagion at a certain point in time or a time dependent contagion index. Presenting interdependent 
spillover magnitudes in a system e.g. by attaching different intensities of colour corresponding to the 
magnitude of a particular spillover effect generates a so called “heat map”. By looking at consecutive 
points in time those heat maps change colour and illustrate the build-up or diminishing of potential 
contagion. Features of this toolbox allow us to identify systemically relevant entities (i.e. country 
specific banking sectors and sovereigns) from the proposed set of sovereigns and banks in our system. 
We have proposed in this paper a simple method to compute thresholds for “excessive” spillovers, 
based on empirical distributions of CDS changes in combination with subjective preferences.  
  Our results show a clear upward pattern of growing interdependencies between banks and 
sovereigns, that represents a potential source of systemic risk. Euro area sovereign creditworthiness 
carries a growing weight in the overall financial market picture, with a sub-set of sovereigns that can 
potentially produce negative externalities to the financial system. We find that several previous policy 
interventions had a mitigating impact on spillover risks. In our application we find that a shock in 
Spanish sovereign CDS reveals an elevated impact on both euro area sovereigns and banks during the 
first half of 2012, compared to 2011. Moreover, spillover effects from a shock to Spanish sovereign 
CDS to euro zone core countries and to non-core countries become more similar in magnitude during 
2012. We also found strong evidence that the nexus between sovereigns and banks amplified strongly 
until the end of June 2012. However, systemic contributions of Greece, Portugal and Ireland decrease 
remarkably after the implementation of IMF/EU programs. Nevertheless, Ireland regains its positive 
net spillover status since the beginning of 2012. The setup of the EFSF and the decision of the two 
LTROs in December 2012 have a mitigating impact on all four contagion index components. By 
contrast, nationalization of Bankia in Spain has had a further growing impact on all four contagion 
index components. 
  For future research, we plan to extend our approach along various avenues. We will extend 
our tool by incorporating extreme realisations and capturing the dynamics using extreme-value-theory 
as well as Monte Carlo simulations. We will further improve the statistical and econometric 
framework tool and derive statistical distributions of impulse response functions. With regard to 
economic applications the next steps will be to extend the model to real economy entities and capture 
potential spillovers to different sectors in order to shed light on macro-financial interlinkages. 
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Appendix	
A1.	Description	of	variables	and	events	
Table A1.1: Composition and description of bank-specific and exogenous variables  
Name of the 
Variable 
Composition or description 
Endogenous variables 
AT_bks  Erste Group Bank, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich 
BE_bks  DEXIA Group, KBC Group 
FR_bks  BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, Societe Generale 
DE_bks  Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, DZ Bank, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, 
Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen, HSH Nordbank, WestLB 
GR_bks  EFG Eurobank Ergas, National Bank Of Greece 
IT_bks  Unicredito, Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca Montepaschi Di Siena,  Unione Di Banche 
Italiene (UBI), Banca Popolare Italiana 
NL_bks  ING Bank, Rabobank, SNS Bank 
ES_bks  Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria  (BBVA), Banco Pastor, Banco 
Popolar Espnol, Caja de Ahorros, Banco Sabadell 
ES_bks_G1  Banco Santander , Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) 
ES_bks_G2  Banco Pastor, Banco Popolar Espnol, Caja de Ahorros, Banco Sabadell  
PT_bks  Banco Comercial Portugues , Banco BPI, Banco Espirito Santo, Caixa General De 
Depositos 
Exogenous variables 
SOVXWE  iTraxx  SovX Western Europe
21 
SNRFIN  iTraxx Europe Senior Financials 
ITRXEUR  iTraxx Europe index (125 investment grade companies, all sectors) 
XOVER  iTraxx Crossover index (50 sub-investment grade companies, all sectors) 
EUREON  The spread between 3 month EURIBOR and EONIA 
VIX  The volatility index of S&P 500 
EUROSTOXX  The EURO STOXX 50 Index 
US  The 5 year senior CDS of United States of America 
UK  The 5 year senior CDS of United Kingdom 
UK_bks  Royal Bank of Scotland Group, HSBC Holdings, Barclays Bank, Lloyds TSB Bank 
Note: All endogenous bank variables are computed as asset-weighted averages. All bank components are 5 year senior CDS 
spreads denominated in EUR. Source: CMA (via Datastream) and Bloomberg.   
                                                      
21 For the constituents of these indices please refer to:  
http://www.markit.com/assets/en/docs/products/data/indices/credit-index-annexes/iTraxx_SovX%20WE_Series%207.pdf 
http://www.markit.com/assets/en/docs/products/data/indices/credit-index-annexes/iTraxx%20Europe%20annex_Series%2017.pdf 35 
 
Table A1.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Type 
Variable 
Name 
Variable in levels  Δ(ln(variable)) 
No 
Obs 
Mean  Median  Min  Max 
Std 
Dev 
Skew  Kurtosis 
JB 
Test 
ADFv1 
pValue 
ADFv2 
pValue 
No 
Obs 
Mean  Median  Min  Max 
Std 
Dev 
Skew  Kurtosis 
JB 
Test 
ADFv1 
pValue 
ADFv2 
pValue 
E
n
d
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
 
C
D
S
 
S
o
v
e
r
e
i
g
n
s
 
AT  718  107  86  49  239  47.80  0.85  2.33  101  0.618  0.269  717  0.227  0.252 ‐ 30.75  21.03  3.76 ‐ 1.01  15.92  5,109  0.001  0.001 
BE  718  167  150  32  403  85.90  0.23  2.05  34  0.551  0.118  717  0.143  0.051  ‐32.52  21.36  4.10  ‐0.47  9.31  1,214  0.001  0.001 
FI  718  44  33  16  90  21.36  0.71  1.94  95  0.740  0.268  717  0.124  0.081 ‐ 19.61  32.93  4.22  0.53  9.92  1,466  0.001  0.001 
FR  718  109  84  21  247  61.20  0.51  1.94  65  0.671  0.172  717  0.241  0.187  ‐22.05  18.12  4.35  ‐0.09  5.36  167  0.001  0.001 
GR  718  3,680  1,010  122  25,961  5512  2.57  9.84  2,189  0.391  0.336  717  0.172  0.026 ‐ 15.44  17.98  4.02  0.33  4.74  104  0.001  0.001 
DE  718  57  46  19  121  25.95  0.57  2.04  66  0.724  0.135  717  0.268  0.089  ‐17.36  19.59  4.15  0.09  4.68  85  0.001  0.001 
IR  718  505  582  115  1,287  254.48 ‐ 0.10  2.03  29  0.526  0.695  717  0.665  0.220 ‐ 104.45  50.10  8.05 ‐ 2.84  50.00  66,951  0.001  0.001 
IT  718  259  191  68  596  150.19  0.66  1.99  83  0.652  0.157  717  0.191  0.014  ‐18.33  22.22  4.10  0.18  5.63  211  0.001  0.001 
NL  718  64  49  25  136  32.55  0.73  2.01  93  0.723  0.344  717  0.179  0.112 ‐ 35.24  22.11  4.04 ‐ 0.63  14.16  3,771  0.001  0.001 
ES  718  282  256  68  618  130.45  0.34  2.50  21  0.721  0.002  717  0.253  0.219  ‐40.43  21.54  4.84  ‐0.40  11.45  2,154  0.001  0.001 
PT  718  639  495  53  1,762  431.89  0.30  1.67  64  0.523  0.317  717  0.168  0.000 ‐ 18.64  17.49  3.92  0.24  5.12  141  0.001  0.001 
C
D
S
 
B
a
n
k
s
 
At_bks  718  192  167  121  374  62.78  1.05  2.97  131  0.611  0.516  717  0.048  0.008  ‐20.06  12.04  3.27  ‐0.34  5.93  270  0.001  0.001 
BE_bks  718  338  255  141  744  180.00  0.80  2.18  97  0.915  0.494  717  0.094  0.000  ‐18.54  20.64  3.49  0.68  8.20  864  0.001  0.001 
FR_bks  718  167  131  56  380  83.47  0.74  2.22  83  0.522  0.021  717  0.063  0.000  ‐25.19  15.07  3.01  ‐0.11  11.89  2,361  0.001  0.001 
GR_bks  718  1,166  966  139  3,634  693.84  0.51  2.49  40  0.381  0.001  717  0.188  0.072 ‐ 17.22  11.34  2.72 ‐ 0.13  6.79  432  0.001  0.001 
DE_bks  718  145  131  76  319  50.29  0.77  2.74  72  0.530  0.055  717  0.160  0.005  ‐40.79  19.15  4.77  ‐0.61  11.03  1,973  0.001  0.001 
IT_bks  718  253  188  64  690  160.96  0.79  2.35  88  0.748  0.203  717  0.324 ‐ 0.034 ‐ 50.70  45.86  6.15  0.54  24.77  14,191  0.001  0.001 
NL_bks  718  132  116  57  251  50.08  0.62  2.18  67  0.702  0.099  717  0.090  0.000  ‐20.28  15.12  3.57  0.06  5.48  184  0.001  0.001 
ES_bks  718  356  327  124  712  153.85  0.42  2.25  38  0.805  0.288  717  0.200  0.051 ‐ 30.70  16.57  3.85 ‐ 0.48  9.60  1,522  0.001  0.001 
ES_bks_G1  718  234  228  66  484  101.60  0.38  2.42  27  0.695  0.002  717  0.272  0.114 ‐ 37.53  19.37  4.27 ‐ 0.57  12.14  2,535  0.001  0.001 
ES_bks_G2  718  478  426  181  940  206.10  0.45  2.08  50  0.916  0.560  717  0.128 ‐ 0.011 ‐ 23.88  13.77  3.42 ‐ 0.39  7.05  509  0.001  0.001 
PT_bks  718  644  635  74  1,378  372.74  0.08  1.83  42  0.703  0.839  717  0.207  0.050 ‐ 43.57  19.18  4.68 ‐ 1.01  14.72  4,224  0.001  0.001 
E
x
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
 
C
D
S
 
I
n
d
i
c
e
s
 
SOVXWE  718  202  183  47  386  97.30  0.17  1.79  47  0.666  0.106  717  0.105  0.000  ‐25.94  16.60  3.52  ‐0.14  8.32  847  0.001  0.001 
SNRFIN  718  172  160  64  355  69.27  0.44  2.21  42  0.630  0.027  717  0.068 ‐ 0.112 ‐ 14.40  29.07  4.25  0.74  7.32  623  0.001  0.001 
ITRX EUR  718  120  109  65  208  34.66  0.75  2.45  76  0.656  0.174  717  0.065  0.029  ‐25.98  15.28  3.24  ‐0.42  9.77  1,389  0.001  0.001 
XOVER  718  534  502  352  874  129.20  0.64  2.28  64  0.516  0.280  717  0.004 ‐ 0.053 ‐ 20.59  12.65  2.94 ‐ 0.04  7.14  512  0.001  0.001 
O
t
h
e
r
 
EUREON  718  0.61  0.49  0.22  1.35  0.29  0.96  2.87  111  0.447  0.987  717  ‐0.076  ‐0.627  ‐35.06  40.55  7.28  0.85  6.94  550  0.001  0.001 
EURSTOXX  718  257  263  201  297  23.75 ‐ 0.50  2.09  54  0.476  0.252  717 ‐ 0.080  0.079 ‐ 17.41  17.78  3.03 ‐ 0.19  9.63  1,318  0.001  0.001 
US CDS  718  43  43  20  64  7.75  ‐0.53  3.35  38  0.631  0.052  717  0.094  0.000  ‐18.54  20.64  3.49  0.68  8.20  864  0.001  0.001 
UK CDS  718  72  71  44  103  12.76  0.24  2.56  13  0.551  0.089  717  0.048  0.008 ‐ 20.06  12.04  3.27 ‐ 0.34  5.93  270  0.001  0.001 
UK_bks  718  159  143  82  291  51.34  0.60  2.16  65  0.589  0.024  717  0.213  0.002  ‐17.53  10.69  2.97  ‐0.57  8.40  910  0.001  0.001 
VIX  718 23 21  14  48 6.24 1.31 4.35 259 0.212 0.020 717 ‐ 0.016 0.000 ‐5.54 8.67 1.46 0.02 5.82 238 0.001  0.001 
Note: “JB test” refers to the Jarque–Bera test for normality. The JB test statistic is   distributed. The null hypothesis is rejected in all cases, for both CDS levels and log first-differences. “ADFv1” and “ADFv2” refer 
to the augmented Dickey–Fuller test for unit-roots. “ADFv1” has an “autoregressive” model and “ADFv2” refers to the “trend stationary” model. The null-hypothesis of existence of a unit root cannot be rejected for 
levels, but can be rejected in the case of log first-differences.  
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Table A1.3: Country-specific bank assets and the weight in the 
country bank index 
No. Country  Bank name  Assets*  Weight 
1  Austria  Erste Group  216,709  0.59 
2  Austria  Raiffeisen Zentralbank  148,798  0.41 
3  Belgium  Dexia Group  412,759  0.59 
4  Belgium  KBC Group  290,635  0.41 
5  France  BNP Paribas  1,965,283  0.40 
6  France  Crédit Agricole  1,723,608  0.35 
7  France  Société Générale  1,181,372  0.24 
8  Germany  Deutsche Bank  2,103,295  0.51 
9  Germany  Commerzbank  691,014  0.17 
10 Germany  DZ Bank  388,525  0.09 
11 Germany  Landesbank Baden-Württemberg  373,059  0.09 
12 Germany  Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen  163,985  0.04 
13 Germany  HSH Nordbank  150,930  0.04 
14 Germany  WestLB  220,179  0.05 
15 Greece  EFG Eurobank Ergas  73,587  0.41 
16 Greece  National Bank Of Greece  104,095  0.59 
17 Italy  Unicredito  926,769  0.44 
18 Italy  Intesa Sanpaolo  652,630  0.31 
19 Italy  Banca Montepaschi Di Siena  244,300  0.12 
20 Italy  Unione Di Banche Italiene  131,511  0.06 
21 Italy  Banca Popolare Italiana  134,942  0.06 
22 Netherlands  ING Group  1,241,729  0.72 
23 Netherlands  Rabobank  404,682  0.23 
24 Netherlands  SNS Bank  78,918  0.05 
25 Portugal  Banco Comercial Portugues  92,029  0.27 
26 Portugal  Banco BPI  44,754  0.13 
27 Portugal  Banco Espirito Santo  81,265  0.24 
28 Portugal  Caixa General De Depositos  118,637  0.35 
29 Spain  Banco Santander**  1,283,349  0.57 
30 Spain  BBVA**  600,477  0.27 
31 Spain  Banco Popolar Espanol  158,207  0.07 
32 Spain  Banco Sabadell  105,321  0.05 
33 Spain  Caja de Ahorros  70,667  0.03 
34 Spain  Banco Pastor  30,376  0.01 
35 UK  Royal Bank of Scotland  1,506,867  0.23 
36 UK  HSBC  2,555,579  0.38 
37 UK  Barclays 1,563,527  0.24 
38 UK  Lloyds TSB Bank  970,546  0.15 
 Note: * assets are in thousand euros, Q1 2011. ** In section 4.1, the two 
Spanish banks (Banco Santander, BBVA) are considered as being part of 
ES_Bks_G1, and the rest four Spanish banks (Banco Popolar Espnol, 
Banco Sabadell, Caja de Ahorros, Banco Pastor) are part of ES_Bks_G2.  
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Table A1.4: Selected events during the Euro-area sovereign/banking crisis and the cumulative returns of contagion indices 
 
Note: * Since our analysis ends on 3
 July 2012, the cumulative return around/after the EU Summit is computed only for the next 5 days. 
±10D around the event refers to the cumulative return between the values of the index 10 days after the event and 10 days before the event, 
such that the event is centred. 
A2. The explicit VAR model with exogenous common factors 
 
A.  Our VAR model with sovereigns, banks, and exogenous variables can be represented as:  
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where   , ~    0,Σ   
(15)
B.  The moving average (MA) representation of the VAR model: 
A VAR (p) model can be represented as: 
         ∑   	     
 
        (16)
Furthermore, a stable VAR process can be rewritten as:     
                	
 
   
  (17)
where    are the Moving Average (MA) coefficient matrices. And   
          (18)
No CI bks CI sovs
CI from 
sovs to 
bks
CI from 
bks to 
sovs CI bks CI sovs
CI from 
sovs to 
bks
CI from  
bks to 
sovs
1 25/03/2010 EU offers support to Greece 31% 14% 19% 26% ‐30% 9% 44% 45%
2 10/05/2010 EU sets up the EFSF; ECB starts SMP ‐5% ‐5% ‐24% ‐2% ‐29% ‐16% ‐45% ‐40%
3 22/11/2010 Ireland seeks financial support ‐16% 2% 27% 12% ‐21% 34% 9% ‐23%
4 06/04/2011 Portugal requests activation of the aid mechanism ‐1% 4% ‐22% ‐15% 0% ‐15% 37% ‐44%
5 15/07/2011 EBA bank stress test results are published ‐10% 7% ‐30% 3% ‐21% 2% ‐16% 54%
6 06/10/2011 ECB announces second covered bond purchase programme ‐24% ‐22% ‐30% ‐54% ‐11% ‐14% ‐22% ‐56%
7 08/12/2011 ECB lowers interest rates by 25 bps ‐21% ‐12% ‐29% ‐26% ‐13% 4% ‐44% ‐41%
8 22/12/2011 LTRO I 3% 9% 22% 48% ‐19% ‐4% ‐14% 10%
9 01/03/2012 LTRO II 1% ‐36% 1% 6% 24% ‐42% ‐15% ‐19%
10 10/05/2012 Spain seizes control of Bankia ‐12% ‐4% ‐3% ‐11% ‐5% 43% 39% 13%
11 18/06/2012 G20 Summit ‐10% 3% 34% 1% 14% ‐3% 68% 16%
12 28/06/2012 EU Summit* 8% ‐16% 3% ‐2% ‐8% ‐10% 16% 12%
10D cumulative return after 
the event
Event Date
±10D cumulative return around 
the event38 
 
A3. Other versions of the contagion indices and systemic contribution of 
sovereigns 
The four components of contagion index, as defined in eqs (11) – (14), can be weighted and summed 
as:  
    
100
    1  
     1   ∗              1   ∗         ∗ ∗       →           →        (19)
The second version of the Contagion Index of sovereigns that we propose is to weight the sum of 
“IN” spillover effects (received) by the euro-area GDP. In this sense we give a higher importance to 
whom is affected by the spillover effects coming from other variables:  
        100 ∗         i→ 
 
   
 
   
  (20)
Where    is the GDP weight of sovereign i in the Eurozone.
22 
The third version of the CI sovereigns is to weight the sum of “OUT” spillover effects (sent) by the 
euro-area GDP. In this sense we give a higher importance to who affects the others:  
         100 ∗            i→ 
 
   
 
   
  (21)
Similarly,    is the GDP-adjusted weight of sovereign i in the Eurozone’s total GDP. 
After we have introduced all these measures that derive from the Contagion Matrix, we can re-define 
our systemic contribution of a sovereign measure: 
Version 2:              
     ,			  →∗
      
 
    ,			 ∗→ 
     
    ,  (22)
Version 3:              
      ,			  
∑       ,			  	∗	       ,   
 0
 
 
    ,  (23)
where        ,			     is an indicator function that allows only positive net total contagion effects to be 
summed (since the sum of       ,			   equals zero). 
Extension 1 – Residuals and IRs from the VARX(2) model with sovereign CDS changes. The 
aggregation of the impulse responses from a system only with sovereigns, calculated as the expected 
shock impact in     : 	
          												        ∗	
       
     
∗
∑                             ,   
       
	   (24)
Where: 
          is the expected default frequency of      (as calculated by Moody’s) 
                    , 	 is the (average) cumulated response of            to a shock in  
           
                                                      
22 Since we are not considering in our analysis all euro area countries we adjust these weights, such that they sum up to 1. 39 
 
        	 , 	 is the Trade weight of            in Total Exports of            
         is the weight of total holdings of           ’s Banking System towards            
as reported in the BIS Foreign Claims (ultimate risk basis) database 
        is the ratio Total Governmental Debt/GDP of             
        is the ratio Total Assets of Banks/GDP of             
                          ,                     are the average responses of 
financial institutions, domestic and foreign. 
Extension 2 – Residuals and impulse responses from the VARX(2) model with sovereign and bank 
CDS changes. The aggregation of IRs from a system with banks and sovereigns: 
          
       
     
	 	
∑       		  ∗                  ,   
       
 
              
                   
∑     		    
                   	  					
        	     
             
                                 
(25)
Where: 
        is the ratio Total Assets of Banks/GDP of             
                          ,                    are the average responses of 
financial institutions (domestic and foreign). 
Different	versions	of	the	Contagion	Index	and	systemic	contributions	of	
sovereigns	(a	comparison)	
We calibrate differently our contagion index for euro-area sovereigns and show that there are no 
significant differences when we use eqs (20) and (21) instead of (10).  In this analysis, we show that 
when we put more weight on countries with higher GDP, that are being influenced by spillover effects 
from other countries, the contagion index (CIwOUT, blue line) tops the preceding highest level during 
the Spanish debt developments (on 10
th April 2012). This index version has the role of highlighting a 
higher interdependence between big countries and small countries. If the former ones are affected by 
contagion, it can be considered a red flag for the entire stability of the system.  
Figure A3.1: Different versions of the EA Contagion Index (in percentage points) of sovereigns 
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A4. Spillover and Net Spillover Matrices 
 
Table A4.1: The spillover matrix of EA sovereigns and banks (on 18 July 2011) 
 Response 
 
Impulse  AT  BE  FI  FR  GR  DE  IE  IT  NL  PT  ES  AT_bks  BE_bks  FR_bks  GR_bks  DE_bks  IT_bks  NL_bks  PT_bks  ES_bks 
Sum 
OUT 
AT  .  0.51  0.00  0.91  0.62  0.52  0.48  0.85  0.43  0.33  0.82  0.12  0.03  0.71  0.00  0.58  0.20  0.21  0.85  0.78  8.95 
BE  0.36  .  0.00  0.37  0.22  0.01  0.47  0.73  0.05  0.37  0.83  0.12  0.08  0.16  0.00  0.12  0.02  0.13  0.29  0.31  4.64 
FI  0.00  0.00  .  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.19  0.03  0.07  0.04  0.00  0.12  0.08  0.00  0.58  0.00  0.27  0.00  0.12  0.02  1.53 
FR  0.81  0.44  0.00  .  0.47  0.38  0.37  0.61  0.37  0.03  0.70  0.25  0.06  0.44  0.00  0.39  0.18  0.01  0.52  0.67  6.71 
GR  0.25  0.11  0.06  0.17  .  0.09  0.23  0.05  0.26  0.20  0.16  0.00  0.14  0.11  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.07  0.02  2.00 
DE  0.54  0.05  0.00  0.45  0.36  .  0.41  0.09  0.37  0.30  0.16  0.01  0.40  0.43  0.04  0.26  0.27  0.28  0.39  0.21  5.01 
IE  0.30  0.34  0.18  0.32  0.34  0.22  .  0.31  0.00  0.71  0.39  0.06  0.41  0.15  0.00  0.10  0.03  0.14  0.43  0.24  4.68 
IT  0.25  0.63  0.00  0.38  0.05  0.09  0.21  .  0.17  0.21  0.56  0.04  0.02  0.16  0.03  0.10  0.16  0.10  0.29  0.28  3.73 
NL  0.22  0.22  0.37  0.39  0.19  0.38  0.04  0.61  .  0.07  0.12  0.02  0.20  0.14  0.58  0.15  0.33  0.21  0.21  0.17  4.60 
PT  0.11  0.26  0.03  0.08  0.24  0.35  0.91  0.34  0.00  .  0.26  0.00  0.26  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.25  0.39  0.02  3.70 
ES  0.45  0.63  0.00  0.35  0.35  0.06  0.36  0.64  0.04  0.41  .  0.14  0.00  0.28  0.00  0.24  0.07  0.20  0.38  0.43  5.04 
AT_bks  0.36  0.09  0.49  0.47  0.44  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.39  0.00  0.37  .  0.00  0.34  0.97  0.56  0.23  0.14  0.26  0.67  5.79 
BE_bks  0.28  0.27  0.28  0.20  0.69  0.44  0.36  0.09  0.40  0.19  0.05  0.00  .  0.47  0.12  0.28  0.39  0.29  0.30  0.06  5.16 
FR_bks  0.63  0.08  0.14  0.55  0.78  0.39  0.25  0.07  0.37  0.06  0.25  0.12  0.49  .  0.19  0.50  0.26  0.21  0.43  0.37  6.15 
GR_bks  0.02  0.08  0.11  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.00  0.03  0.12  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.08  0.05  .  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.82 
DE_bks  0.83  0.34  0.17  0.76  0.64  0.49  0.37  0.46  0.49  0.09  0.65  0.45  0.55  0.95  0.00  .  0.80  0.49  0.81  0.93  10.30 
IT_bks  0.50  0.22  0.26  0.49  0.33  0.55  0.13  0.42  0.61  0.06  0.47  0.22  0.64  0.75  0.08  0.67  .  0.38  0.63  0.69  8.12 
NL_bks  0.03  0.00  0.21  0.03  0.45  0.19  0.16  0.00  0.44  0.13  0.12  0.31  0.53  0.45  0.24  0.36  0.43  .  0.07  0.25  4.40 
PT_bks  0.75  0.37  0.06  0.74  0.23  0.50  0.42  0.65  0.23  0.20  0.68  0.29  0.19  0.64  0.00  0.55  0.56  0.20  .  0.77  8.02 
ES_bks  0.75  0.36  0.07  0.69  0.15  0.20  0.27  0.67  0.38  0.04  0.75  0.36  0.00  0.55  0.00  0.66  0.46  0.22  0.75  .  7.32 
Sum IN  7.45  5.01  2.44  7.40  6.58  4.91  5.63  6.67  5.21  3.47  7.37  2.71  4.15  6.89  2.82  5.55  4.83  3.50  7.19  6.91  106.66 
Note: Variables in the first column are the impulse origin. Variables on the top row are the respondents to the shock. Values in the matrix represent the average cumulated spillover effect over the first 5 
days. The intensity of a shock on a respondent is marked by different levels of colour (light means no impact and dark means very strong impact). The cumulative impact is bound between 0 and 1. A value 
of 0.5 means that the response variable will be impacted in the same direction with an intensity of 50% the initial unexpected shock in the impulse variable. If the initial shock has a magnitude of 10 bps then 
the response variable is expected to increase by 5 bps in the following week. In the last column we have the aggregated impact sent (Sum OUT) by each row variable and on the bottom row the aggregated 
spillover received (Sum IN) by each column variable. The bottom-right cell (in bold) shows total spillover in the system (by dividing this value to the total number of non-diagonal cells i.e. 20x19 we obtain 
the contagion index of EA sovereigns and banks, as introduced in eq (10)). 41 
 
 
Table A4.2: Net spillover matrix (on 18 July 2011) 
 
Note: If the value in the cell is negative (blue horizontal bar) it means that the row variable is the net receiver and the column variable is the net sender. If the value is positive (red horizontal bar) the column 
variable is net receiver and the row variable is net sender. The last column shows the sum of net spillover effects of the row variable. In case the NET sum spillover is positive (bold values) then the variable is a 
net sender of the system.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Net 
Matrix AT BE FI FR GR DE IE IT NL PT ES AT_bks BE_bks FR_bks GR_bks DE_bks IT_bks NL_bks PT_bks ES_bks
Sum 
NET
AT 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.37 ‐0.02 0.17 0.60 0.22 0.23 0.37 ‐0.25 ‐0.25 0.09 ‐0.02 ‐0.25 ‐0.31 0.18 0.10 0.03 1.51
BE ‐0.15 0.00 0.00 ‐0.07 0.11 ‐0.04 0.13 0.10 ‐0.17 0.11 0.19 0.03 ‐0.20 0.09 ‐0.08 ‐0.21 ‐0.20 0.12 ‐0.09 ‐0.05 ‐0.38
FI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ‐0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 ‐0.29 0.01 0.00 ‐0.37 ‐0.20 ‐0.14 0.46 ‐0.17 0.01 ‐0.21 0.06 ‐0.04 ‐0.91
FR ‐0.10 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.30 ‐0.07 0.06 0.23 ‐0.02 ‐0.05 0.36 ‐0.22 ‐0.14 ‐0.11 ‐0.04 ‐0.37 ‐0.31 ‐0.03 ‐0.22 ‐0.02 ‐0.69
GR ‐0.37 ‐0.11 0.06 ‐0.30 0.00 ‐0.26 ‐0.11 0.00 0.07 ‐0.04 ‐0.19 ‐0.44 ‐0.55 ‐0.68 ‐0.04 ‐0.62 ‐0.32 ‐0.40 ‐0.16 ‐0.14 ‐4.58
DE 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.00 ‐0.01 ‐0.05 0.10 0.01 ‐0.03 0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.22 ‐0.28 0.09 ‐0.11 0.00 0.10
IE ‐0.17 ‐0.13 ‐0.01 ‐0.06 0.11 ‐0.20 0.00 0.11 ‐0.04 ‐0.20 0.03 0.05 0.05 ‐0.10 0.00 ‐0.27 ‐0.09 ‐0.02 0.01 ‐0.02 ‐0.95
IT ‐0.60 ‐0.10 ‐0.03 ‐0.23 0.00 0.00 ‐0.11 0.00 ‐0.44 ‐0.13 ‐0.08 0.04 ‐0.07 0.09 0.00 ‐0.37 ‐0.26 0.10 ‐0.36 ‐0.39 ‐2.94
NL ‐0.22 0.17 0.29 0.02 ‐0.07 0.01 0.04 0.44 0.00 0.07 0.08 ‐0.37 ‐0.21 ‐0.23 0.46 ‐0.35 ‐0.29 ‐0.23 ‐0.02 ‐0.21 ‐0.61
PT ‐0.23 ‐0.11 ‐0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.20 0.13 ‐0.07 0.00 ‐0.15 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00 ‐0.09 0.03 0.12 0.19 ‐0.02 0.23
ES ‐0.37 ‐0.19 0.00 ‐0.36 0.19 ‐0.10 ‐0.03 0.08 ‐0.08 0.15 0.00 ‐0.23 ‐0.05 0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.41 ‐0.40 0.08 ‐0.30 ‐0.31 ‐2.33
AT_bks 0.25 ‐0.03 0.37 0.22 0.44 ‐0.01 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 0.37 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.90 0.10 0.01 ‐0.17 ‐0.03 0.31 3.09
BE_bks 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.55 0.03 ‐0.05 0.07 0.21 ‐0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 ‐0.02 0.05 ‐0.27 ‐0.25 ‐0.25 0.10 0.06 1.01
FR_bks ‐0.09 ‐0.09 0.14 0.11 0.68 ‐0.03 0.10 ‐0.09 0.23 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.22 0.02 0.00 0.15 ‐0.46 ‐0.49 ‐0.24 ‐0.21 ‐0.18 ‐0.74
GR_bks 0.02 0.08 ‐0.46 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 ‐0.46 0.00 0.02 ‐0.90 ‐0.05 ‐0.15 0.00 0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.23 0.00 0.01 ‐2.01
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